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The United States Supreme Court's decision in Fuman v. Georgia5
was not a clear statement reflecting a single perspective on the ills of
capital punishment. Rather, it was nine separate statements reflecting
the particular views and concerns of each Justice. Of the five concur-
ring Justices, Brennan and Marshall found that, arbitrariness aside, the
death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment per se; Justice Mar-
shall also found that it was used in a discriminatory way against blacks
and other minorities. Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White, on the
other hand, found the death penalty unconstitutional because of the ar-
bitrariness of its administration under then existing statutes. Justice
Douglas identified discrimination against minorities, blacks, and disad-
vantaged persons as an aspect of the arbitrariness. Justice Stewart and
White, however, described the arbitrariness in different terms-as
"freakish," "random," and "rare," like being "struck by lightning" or
being "chosen in a lottery." These two pivotal members of the Furman
plurality thus adopted formulations of the arbitrariness as unsystematic
in nature, dissociated from specific extralegal sources, such as race or
class, that might exercise a systematic effect. The problem, according to
their diagnosis, was like that faced by a traveler following an unclear or
* Will appear in an expanded form as Chapter Ten in W. Bowers, Legal Homicide:
Death as Punishment in America, 1864-1982 (Northeastern University Press, Spring, 1984)
(forthcoming).
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imprecise map; he or she must rely on intuition and guesswork and is
thus apt to make mistakes. The solution for the traveler is, obviously, a
better map.
By a similar logic, the Court blamed this arbitrariness on shortcom-
ings in the pre-Furman capital statutes. These laws provided unclear or
insufficient guidance to those who must decide whether to impose a sen-
tence of death. The unguided, standardless exercise of discretion in cap-
ital sentencing is subject to errors of judgment in much the same way as
is the traveler with an inadequate map. The solution was to formulate
capital statutes with (1) clear standards that would guide juries in sen-
tencing, (2) procedures to remove these decisions from extraneous influ-
ences, and (3) provisions that would subject the decisions to oversight.
Thus, the statutes included provisions for explicit enumerated aggravat-
ing and mitigating circumstances, separate guilt and sentencing hear-
ings, and automatic appellate review. This was the remedy approved
four years after Furman in Gregg v. Georgia,2 which upheld the capital
statutes of Florida, Georgia, and Texas with the concurrence of Justices
White and Stewart of the Furman plurality.
There is, however, another view of the arbitrariness found unac-
ceptable in Furman. That some persons are sentenced to death and
others are not for essentially the same crime is not, according to this
interpretation, simply the result of confusion owing to insufficient gui-
dance, insulation, and oversight in the exercise of discretion. Rather, it
exists because those who exercise such discretion are consistent and be-
cause their behavior reflects systematic, though perhaps unrecognized,
extralegal influences such as race, class, and origin.
Behind this alternative diagnosis is a perspective on capital punish-
ment which holds that death as punishment is unique in its power to
express community sentiments of condemnation. Death, therefore, will
be imposed for those crimes that most offend community conscience, not
strictly because they are the most legally culpable, but because they vio-
late social mores and boundaries. 3 Thus, offenses will be viewed as more
or less shocking and abhorrent depending upon who the victims and
offenders are in social, not just legal, terms. Persons disfavored or disad-
vantaged by class, race, or origin will be singled out disproportionately
for capital punishment, especially when their victims are members of
the dominant group in the community. Further, the death penalty's
expressive functions will be sought especially when cultural mores and
boundaries are threatened by social change, when social change is asso-
2 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
3 For a fuller discussion of this analysis, see W. Bowers, Legal Homicide: Death as Pun-
ishment in America, 1864-1982 (forthcoming) (see especially Chapter Five).
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ciated with rising crime rates, and when those crime rates are attributed
to socially disfavored or disadvantaged persons. Under such conditions,
community sentiments will call for capital punishment whether it is le-
gally justified or not.
As a representative cross-section of the community, the jury embod-
ies community sentiments. Jurors are not like travelers in an unfamiliar
territory. They have their own internalized maps of the social land-
scape. Jurors may have difficulty replacing their socially conditioned
views of victims and offenders with strictly legal considerations, espe-
cially for the crimes they find most shocking and abhorrent. Thus, in-
terpretations of statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances in
the sentencing decision are apt to be colored by extralegal considera-
tions. Such extralegal influences will not be restricted to the sentencing
process; indeed, according to this view, they will be deeply imbedded in
other discretionary decisions in the processing of potentially capital
cases.
Prosecutors, who are typically elected,4 must be sensitive to com-
munity sentiments and reactions to crime, which they will encounter in
the media, among associates; and from the police, families of victims,
and prominent community spokesmen. In addition to the courtroom
presentation of a case, such sentiments and reactions may influence a
host of less public actions that greatly affect the likelihood of a death
sentence: whether to bring a capital charge, whether to accept a guilty
plea in return for a reduced charge or sentence, whether to offer a re-
duced charge or sentence to one defendant in return for testimony
against another, whether to develop evidence of statutory aggravating
circumstances, and whether to seek a death sentence given conviction.
To maintain community support and to win reelection, prosecutors are
likely to seek the death penalty when the community wants it, apart
from strictly legal considerations.
Defense attorneys in capital cases are also affected by community
sentiments. A disproportionate number of them are court-appointed,
rather than privately retained attorneys, who work with severely limited
resources for conducting investigations, hiring expert witnesses, and in
general preparing an effective capital defense. 5 Intense community hos-
tility toward defendants can add to the difficulty of investigating the
4 See National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service, U.S. Department of
Justice, Sourcebook of Criminial Justice Statistics 100 & Table 1.51 (1979). Forty-four states
have only elected prosecutors; one state has both elected and appointed; three states have no
local prosecutors because all cases are handled by the attorney general.
5 The figures compiled by the State Public Defenders' Office in California give some
indication of which lawyers defend capital cases. There were 336 capital cases pending as of
July 1, 1983. Of these, 154 defendants were represented in court by public defenders; 182 by
private counsel, of which approximately 95% were court-appointed. Personal communication
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case, identifying rebuttal witnesses, and developing evidence of mitiga-
tion. Community sentiment may also develop into mistrust or animos-
ity toward the lawyer who aggressively attempts to build a strong trial
record, expose police, prosecutorial, or judicial errors, and challenge the
constitutionality of capital punishment itself. For court-appointed at-
torneys in particular, this sort of defense can provoke impatience and
resentment from the bench, and thus jeopardize future court appoint-
ments. In other words, the system assigns to the least experienced, re-
sourceful, and independent members of the bar these especially difficult
cases where the defendant's life is at stake and extralegal influences are
strongly felt.
Nor are judges-federal, state, or local-immune from extralegal
influences. Like prosecutors, defense attorneys, and jurors, they are the
products of the cultures and the communities from which they come. In
many places, state and local judges, like prosecutors, are elected and
thus accountable to the public. Appellate court judges usually are re-
moved from the specific influences at work in the local community
where a crime occurs, but they are not removed from the broader histor-
ical, political, and social context that has supported the arbitrary and
discriminatory imposition of capital punishment. Indeed, most appel-
late court judges are only a step or two removed from the trial court
where they themselves may have imposed the death penalty.
To summarize the argument, if the death penalty exists primarily
for the extralegal functions it serves, and if the arbitrariness found unac-
ceptable in Furman is a systematic reflection of this fact, then this arbi-
trariness should be evident in the decisions of participants at the various
stages throughout the processing of potentially capital cases. Statutory
reforms designed to regulate the exercise of discretion at one stage of the
process, such as those approved in Gregg, are predicated upon a diagno-
sis that fails to recognize the pervasive and systematic character of the
problem. To the extent that such reforms are effective at one point in
the process, they may simply shift or displace arbitrariness to other
points in the process.
This Article analyzes the decisions and actions of individuals in-
volved at four stages in the procedural history of potentially capital
cases: the prosecutor's discretionary decision to bring charges and to go
with Michael G. Millman, Director, State Public Defenders' Office, California, September
28, 1983.
For a discussion of how restricted the resources of court-appointed attorneys are and how
they depend upon the presiding judge's authorization for payment of the costs they incur in
preparing a defense, see M. Brennan, Capital Representation in the State of Florida 75-77,




to trial; the allocation and effectiveness of defense services; the decisions
to seek and to impose the death sentence upon convicted offenders; and
the proportionality review of death sentences by state appellate courts.
The analysis concludes with a closer look at the exercise of discretion in
the federal appeals process.
II. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN CHARGING AND TRYING CASES
A beneficial effect of post-Funnan guided discretion statutes, noted
Justice White in Gregg v. Georgia, is that prosecutors will be guided in
their exercise of discretion by the same statutory aggravating and miti-
gating standards "as those by which a jury will decide the questions of
guilt and sentence."'6 Our analysis posits, however, that in the hands of
prosecutors the statutory guidelines approved in Gregg may operate to
promote, rather than to curb, arbitrariness and discrimination early in
the handling of potentially capital cases. In a previous examination of
data on the grand jury indictments of persons charged with criminal
homicide in Florida, we observed that indictment disparities by race
and location within the state contribute substantially to the overall level
of arbitrariness and discrimination in the process leading to the death
sentence. 7 These data suggested further that racial considerations lead
prosecutors to "upgrade" some cases by alleging an aggravating felony
circumstance or charging the defendant with an accompanying felony,
and to "downgrade" others by ignoring evidence in police reports or
withholding a charge, depending upon the race of the offender and the
victim.8
Using the Florida processing data, we now carry the analysis of
prosecutorial discretion a step further by examining factors that may
affect the prosecutor's ability to obtain a first degree murder indictment.
6 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 225 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
7 See Bowers & Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination under Post- Furman Capital Statutes, 26
CRIME AND DELINQ. 563 (1980). The work of Bowers and Pierce will be published as Chap-
ter Seven of W. Bowers, supra note 3. Later references to this article will, for the sake of
brevity, be restricted to Chapter Seven of the book, but this is identical to Bowers & Pierce,
supra.
8 A further study of the upgrading and downgrading of cases in terms of an aggravating
felony circumstance is now being extended. See M. Radelet & G. Pierce, Race and
Prosecutorial Discretion in Homicide Cases (Sept. 4, 1983) (paper presented at the 1983 meet-
ing of the American Sociological Association in Detroit). With additional information on
homicide victims from the Florida Bureau of Vital Statistics, Michael Radelet has succeeded
in matching many more police reports and court records. Moreover, these data show that in
upgraded cases (those having a felony circumstance added in the court case records when the
police reports indicated no such circumstances), prosecutors were less likely to offer or accept
a plea bargain-further suggesting their determination to seek a death sentence. Similar pat-
terns are now under investigation in South Carolina by Joseph Jacoby and Raymond Pater-
noster. See Jacoby & Paternoster, Sentencing Disparity and Juy Packing: Further Challenges to the
Death Penalty, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379 (1982).
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With a sample of persons charged with criminal homicide in twenty
Florida counties during 1976-77, 9 we have conducted a multiple regres-
sion analysis (see Table 1) to determine how the indictment decision was
affected by extralegal factors such as race, region, and attorney type,
and a broader group of legally relevant factors than we have previously
considered. 10
The aggravating circumstances include: (1) the presence of an ac-
companying felony; (2) multiple alleged offenders; (3) multiple murder
victims; (4) the fact that the murder victim was old, young, or female
(suggesting victim vulnerability); and (5) the use of a gun as the murder
weapon (suggesting intent to kill). The mitigating factors include evi-
dence from the court record (1) that the defendant was an accomplice or
accessory to the crime, but not the triggerman or actual killer; (2) that
the crime was the result of, or precipitated by, an argument, dispute, or
quarrel; and (3) that the offender was less than eighteen years of age.
We have included in our analysis three factors that in principle
should not affect the handling of the defendant's case: (1) three variables
designating the racial character of the crime-black kills white, white
kills white, white kills black (black kills black is omitted); (2) two vari-
ables identifying the location of the crime within the state: the northern
region, including the north and panhandle of Florida, and the central
region (the circuits of the southern region are omitted); and (3) two vari-
ables indicating type of attorney: private attorneys appointed to the case
and paid for their services by the court, and attorneys employed as pub-
lic defenders by the state to provide services to indigent clients (privately
retained counsel is omitted).
The interpretation of the regression coefficient is straightforward.
All variables in the analysis have been entered in binary forms,1 ' hence
the regression coefficient for a given variable corresponds to the percent-
age difference in first degree murder indictments between the category
of that variable in the table and the omitted or reference category, con-
trolling statistically for all other variables in the analysis. For example, a
coefficient of .25 for a felony-related killing corresponds to a twenty-five
point difference in the percentage receiving first degree murder indict-
ments between cases with and cases without an accompanying felony,
controlling for the other variables entered into the regression analysis. In
cases where several mutually exclusive binary variables have been con-
9 For a description of the data, see Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty:
The Florida Experience, 95 HARv. L. REv. 456 (1981).
10 These were restricted to variables in the Florida court processing data with missing
information on no more than 15% of the cases.
11 The characteristic or category of the variable identified in the table is scored "1" and




ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF LEGAL AND EXTRALEGAL FACTORS ON
FIRST DEGREE MURDER INDICTMENT AMONG PERSONS CHARGED
WITH CRIMINAL HOMICIDE IN FLORIDA, 1976-1977
Regression
A. Legally Relevant Factors Coefficients
Felony related killing 0.25**
More than one offender 0.20**
More than one victim 0.18
Female victim 0.18**
Victim 60 years or oldera 0.04
Victim 16 years or youngera -0.07
Gun used as murder weapon -0.06
Defendant accessory -0.04
Defendant 18 years or younger 0.12
Quarrel precipitated killing -0.04
B. Race
Black kills whiteb 0.19*
White kills whiteb 0.15**




D. Type of Attorney
Court appointedd 0.17**
Public defenderd 0.03
Adjusted R2  0.27
Number of Cases 507
a Victims aged 17-59 is the reference category.
b Black kills black is the reference category.
C Southern region of Florida is the reference category. Regional groupings of circuits
are as follows: panhandle (1, 2, 3, 14); north (4, 5, 7, 8); central (6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 18,
19); south (11, 15, 16, 17).
d Privately retained attorneys is the reference category.
* p < .05, 1 test.
** p < .01,1 test.
structed, as with race, region, and attorney type, the reference category
is restricted to those cases excluded from all the component variables.
That is, they share the common reference category of the cases they
jointly exclude. Consequently, the coefficients for the three racial combi-
nations in Table 1, for example, (.19, .15, and - .08) represent the per-
centage difference in first degree murder indictments between the
respective categories and the black kills black category (the jointly ex-
cluded cases). In the 1976-77 sample, data are available on all seventeen
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of these variables for 508, or sixty-six percent of the 771 cases. 12 The
regression results appear in Table 1.
The analysis shows that four legally aggravating factors play a sub-
stantial role in determining a first degree murder indictment: a felony-
related killing has the greatest effect, followed by multiple offenders,
multiple victims, and female victims. Three of the four of these vari-
ables show effects significant beyond the .01 probability level. Contrary
to expectation, one other factor advanced as a mitigating circum-
stance-the offender's youthfulness-also appears to contribute to a first
degree murder indictment, though not significantly so. The remaining
legally relevant factors show slight effects, not exceeding coefficients of
.10.
Critically, the variables designating racial combinations show sub-
stantial and significant effects. That a black has killed a white is virtu-
ally as strong a predictor of a first degree indictment as any of the
legally relevant factors except felony circumstance, ie., the commission
of a separate felony in the course of the homicide.1 3 When the offender
and victim are both white, the effect is not quite as strong but even more
significant statistically. Together, these two racial variables represent a
white-victim effect on first degree indictment that is statistically signifi-
cant well beyond the effect of either variable alone. A further examina-
tion of the data shows that white-victim cases tend to be more
aggravated, but the remaining strongly significant race-of-victim effect
in Table 1 indicates that race figures prominently in the first degree
indictment decision above and beyond legally relevant considerations.
The location of the crime within the state also is an important fac-
tor. The analysis shows a significantly higher level of first degree mur-
der indictments in the central region of Florida (the southern region is
the reference category), when other legally relevant factors have been
controlled. Moreover, the disparity is even greater if we compare this
region with the rest of Florida (the southern and northern regions com-
bined as the reference category). In other words, the chances of a first
degree murder indictment for otherwise comparable cases were signifi-
cantly greater in the central region than elsewhere in Florida.
12 Michael Radelet has supplemented the information available at the time of our earlier
analysis, see W. Bowers, supra note 3, at Chapter Seven, with additional data on race of victim
and date and location of offense from the Florida vital statistics records. The 1976-1977 sam-
ple of criminal homicide arraignments used here excludes four cases used by.Radelet. See
Radelet, Racial Characteristics and the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 46 AM. Soc. REv. 918
(1981).
13 Because there are relatively few black-kills-white cases among all criminal homicide
arraignments in these Florida counties, the statistical significance of this effect (a .03
probability) is less than that of some other variables showing comparable regression coeffi-
cients, but still well within the .05 standard.
1074 [Vol. 74
ARBITRARINESS & DISCRIMINATION
Finally, defendants with court-appointed attorneys were far more
likely to receive a first degree murder indictment compared to those
with privately retained attorneys. Analysis of the data further indicates
that court-appointed attorneys typically handle more difficult cases in
terms of legally aggravating and mitigating considerations than do pub-
lic defenders or privately retained counsel. However, the highly signifi-
cant regression coefficient for court-appointed attorneys in the presence
of these legally aggravating and mitigating factors strongly suggests that
such attorneys are less effective in averting a first degree murder indict-
ment than are other types of attorneys.
Thus, the statistical evidence shows that race and location are pow-
erful independent influences on the likelihood of a first degree murder
indictment. At this early stage in the process that leads to the death
sentence, the prosecutor exercises almost total discretion over the deci-
sion whether to indict for first degree murder.14 The effects of race and
location remain strong not only in the presence of felony circumstances,
but also with controls for other legally relevant considerations.
How does this statistical evidence square with the experiences of
those who handle capital cases? The decisions of prosecutors to bring a
capital charge and to take such a charge to trial recently have been
examined by the Florida Justice Institute through interviews with
judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys.1 5 The sample was drawn
from the same counties as the Florida court processing data presented
above. Many of the respondents had participated in the cases that con-
stitute the data base for the analyses presented above.
The respondents reported a wide range of extralegal influences on
prosecutors' decisions to charge and try capital cases. The answers of a
state circuit court judge illustrate the point. To the question, "What
influences the decision to indict for first degree murder?" he answered:
A high publicity case is more likely to be filed first degree murder. [Also]
pressure from the police-the police will convince themselves they've got a
better case than they do, and the Assistant State Attorney assigned to
charge the case may not be strong enough to stand up to a particular po-
lice investigator.
16
In response to the question, "What influences the decision to take the
case to trial on a first degree murder charge?" he answered:
Facts of the case plus how well the attorneys know each other and how
closely they worked together. You pay more attention to a good attorney
14 See LaFave, Prosecutors' Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 532 (1970).
For a more specific discussion of the extent of prosecutorial discretion in capital cases, see
Boris, Sterolypes and Dispositionsfor Criminal Homicides , 17 CRIMINOLOGY 139 (1979); see also W.
Bowers, supra note 3, at Chapter Seven.
15 M. Brennan, supra note 5.
16 Letter from Mary Brennan to author (Spring, 1983).
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TABLE 2
FACTORS AFFECTING THE DECISION TO BRING A CAPITAL CHARGE
AND TO TAKE SUCH A CHARGE TO TRIAL ACCORDING TO FLORIDA
JUDGES, PROSECUTORS AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS
A. Legal Factors or Considerations
Al. Facts of the case, fact pattern, facts (e.g., do facts fit the
definition of Murder 1)
A2. Aggravating or mitigating considerations (presence,
number, relative weight)
A3. Particular aggravating circumstance (prior record,
accompanying felony, premeditation, heinous or execution-
type killing)
A4. Overall strength of case/probability of conviction
A5. Evidence, quality of evidence/witness credibility, reliability
B. Personal Orientations or Values of Prosecutors
Bl. Aggressiveness, competitiveness, ambition (e.g., personal
pride, win-loss record, notch-in-the-gun syndrome, desire to
be re-elected)
B2. Orientation toward punishment (deterrence, retribution,
appropriateness)
B3. Attitude toward particular defendant or victim
(prominence, character, class, race)
C. Situational Pressures or Constraints in Handling Cases
Cl. Plea bargaining strategy, opposing counsel (e.g., indict high
to force plea, plead 2' for accomplice testimony, experience
of defense counsel)
C2. Time, caseload, office policies, judge's reputation
C3. Influence of victim's family (e.g., victim's family wants
death, can't reduce charge)
C4. Pressure from police (e.g., police press for Murder 1)
D. Social InflUences or Pressures from Community
Dl. Media coverage, publicity, notoriety (including effects on
political climate, plea bargaining, re-election)
D2. Public opinion, reaction (community conscience,
confidence, outrage, anger)
















than one you know is a lightweight, when he communicates with you
about the case ....
[Also] pressure from the top, the supervisor of the Assistant State At-
torney assigned to try the case. Even if the Assistant State Attorney as-
signed to try the case knows he can't win it, he may go to trial anyway
because a directed verdict by the judge [a ruling that first degree murder is
ARBITRARINESS & DISCRIMINATION
not proved as a matter of law so the jury is not allowed to convict for first
degree murder regardless of the original charge] looks better publicity-wise
on the elected State Attorney's record than the office dropping [dismissing
or reducing] the case.
17
Pressure from the police, the division of responsibility in the prose-
cutor's office, the prosecutor's relationship with the defense attorney,
and the political advantage of seeking a death sentence even when the
facts of the case do not warrant it are only a few of the extralegal consid-
erations described by respondents. A more comprehensive picture
emerges from the answers of all respondents. The two questions about
filing a capital charge and taking such a charge to trial yielded some 188
codable responses18 from sixteen judges, sixteen prosecutors, and thirty-
eight defense attorneys. 19 These responses have been grouped into
fifteen categories under four general headings in Table 2.
Respondents mentioned more extralegal considerations-including
the personal orientation of the prosecutor, situational pressures and con-
straints in handling a case, and social influences and pressures from the
community-than factors falling within the general category labelled
"legal factors or considerations." The personal characteristics of prose-
cutors most frequently mentioned were aggressiveness, competitiveness,
and ambition (B 1). The only legal consideration that is cited more often
than these personal attributes is the "facts of the case" (Al). Among
situational pressures and constraints, the most frequently cited were
those referring to plea bargaining (Cl). This category includes state-
ments such as "indict high to force a plea," and "plead to second degree
murder for accomplice testimony." Two themes were prominently men-
tioned under "social influences or pressures from the community:" me-
dia coverage, publicity, and notoriety (Dl), and public opinion and
reactions (D2). Only two other specific categories (Al, the facts of the
case, and Cl, plea bargaining) were more frequently mentioned.
Thus, the influence of extralegal considerations on- the decision to
bring a capital charge and to take it to trial is broadly recognized by
those who prosecute, defend, and judge such cases. One could quarrel
with the placement of certain categories of response in the general
groupings in Table 2. For instance, pressures from the victim's family
(C3) or from the police (C4) might be regarded as social rather than
situational factors; the use of a single aggravating factor to the exclusion
17 Id.
18 Answers were recorded, written down verbatim, and classified into 15 categories. Most
respondents provided a single answer to each question, but some gave more extensive, multi-
ple responses.
19 Responses to these two questions were forwarded to us by Mary Brennan for tabulation




of others (A3) might be considered a personal predisposition of the pros-
ecutor rather than a strictly legal consideration. But these objections do
not alter the fundamental picture of a decision-making process which
responds to social influences from the community, situational pressures
in handling cases, and personal orientations of prosecutors, as well as
legal considerations.
III. ALLOCATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF DEFENSE SERVICES
It is generally said that a good lawyer can greatly affect the out-
come of a case. The unavoidable implication is that those who can af-
ford to retain a good lawyer will have a distinct advantage in the legal
process. Does it work the other way as well? Are impoverished or indi-
gent defendants who must rely upon public defenders or court-ap-
pointed attorneys at a distinct disadvantage in the legal process? The
type of attorney is not a legally relevant consideration that should influ-
ence the outcome of any case, certainly not that of a capital case.
We have seen in Table 1 that defendants with court-appointed at-
torneys are more likely to be indicted for first degree murder than those
with public defenders or privately retained counsel, and that this is not
simply because the most difficult cases end up in the hands of court-
appointed attorneys. Indeed, in equally death-prone cases, 20 court-ap-
pointed attorneys are evidently less effective than other types of attor-
neys in maneuvering to avert a first degree murder indictment. For
whatever reasons, court-appointed attorneys appear to provide less effec-
tive defense services at this early stage in the process. Is this disadvan-
tage to their clients cumulative? Does the defendant with a court-
appointed attorney lose ground at each successive stage of the process?
To learn more about how attorney type affects the defendant's
overall chances of receiving a death sentence, we examined the separate
and joint effects of attorney type, race, region, and legally relevant fac-
tors on the likelihood of a first degree murder conviction from the sam-
ple of those indicted for first degree murder in Florida from 1973
through 1977.21 The independent variables and the analytic procedures
are the same as those used in Table 1 to examine the factors influencing
indictment. The difference is that we are now considering only those
defendants who moved a step closer to a death sentence. The data on
all variables was available for 613, or fifty-nine percent, of the 1045
20 Death-prone cases are cases that, by our analysis, are equally likely to lead to a first
degree murder indictment.
21 Linda Foley and Richard Powell have reported differences in the likelihood of death
sentence by attorney type, but without controlling for other factors associated with the impo-
sition of a death sentence. See Foley & Powell, The Discretion of Prosecutors, Judges and Juries in




ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF LEGAL AND EXTRALEGAL FACTORS ON
FIRST DEGREE MURDER CONVICTION AMONG PERSONS INDICTED
FOR FIRST DEGREE MURDER IN FLORIDA, 1973-1977
Regression
A. Legally Relevant Factors Coefficients
Felony related killing 0.15**
More than one offender 0.10*
More than one victim 0.11
Female victim 0.13**
Victim 60 years or oldera -0.06
Victim 16 years or youngera 0.09
Gun used as murder weapon -0.03
Defendant accessory -0.29**
Defendant 18 years or younger -0.16"*
Quarrel precipitated killing 0.02
B. Race
Black kills white b  0.29**
White kills whiteb 0.18**




D. Type of Attorney
Court appointedd 0.06
Public defenderd 0.00
Adjusted R 2  0.14
Number of Cases 612
a Victims aged 17-59 is the reference category.
b Black kills black is the reference category.
c Southern region of Florida is the reference category as defined in Table 1, note c.
d Privately retained attorneys is the reference category.
* p < .05, 1 test.
** p < .01, t test.
cases in the combined sample of 1973-1977 criminal homicide cases.
22
The results of the regression analysis appear in Table 3.
22 The cases in this sample were collected at two different times by Dr. Linda Foley of
North Florida University and Professor Hans Zeisel of the University of Chicago. Informa-
tion was gathered on all first degree murder indictments from 1973 through 1976 in twenty-
one Florida counties. This accounted for approximately 75% of Florida's death sentences
over that period. To obtain a broader range of homicide cases, including all homicide
charges at arraignment, data later were gathered for the period 1976 through 1977 in a sam-
ple of twenty Florida counties, including some but not all of the counties sampled in the first
phase of the data collection.
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Again, as with first degree murder indictment, the variables of fel-
ony circumstance, number of offenders, and female victim are statisti-
cally significant predictors, and number of victims is comparable in
magnitude but not significant among the legally aggravating factors.
There are, however, two distinct differences between Tables 1 and 3 in
the presumably mitigating factors. First, the youthfulness of the defend-
ant has become a significant mitigating factor in the process leading to
conviction, as compared to its apparently aggravating role at indict-
ment. Second, the fact that a defendant was an accessory rather than
the triggerman significantly reduces the likelihood of a first degree mur-
der conviction. The corresponding reduction in the coefficient for mul-
tiple offenders from Tables 1 to 3 suggests that prosecutors typically will
indict all offenders for first degree murder in multiple-offender cases in
order to bargain for testimony that will convict the alleged triggerman.
Again, the age of the victim, a quarrel as a precipitating factor, and the
use of a gun as the murder weapon show little effect in the presence of
the other predictors.
Race and region remain statistically powerful determinants in-
dependent of legally relevant considerations. Black defendant-white
victim has as strong an effect as any other variable in the analysis. In
fact, the effect on a black offender of having killed a white rather than a
black person (the reference category) is equivalent to the effect on any
offender of committing the murder rather than being the accessory to
the crime. White defendant-white victim is the third strongest predictor
of a first degree murder conviction; thus, the race of the defendant given
a white victim has a nearly significant effect (p =.067) on the likelihood
of a first degree murder conviction, controlling for legally relevant fac-
tors.2 3 Racial bias is stronger in the conviction process than it is in the
indictment (as shown in Table 1).
Region has a statistically significant impact on the conviction stage
of the process as well, and again it is the central region of Florida where
first degree murder convictions are most likely compared with otherwise
comparable cases in the rest of the state. The northern region also shows
a greater likelihood of first degree murder conviction than the southern
region (as the reference category) but the difference does not reach sta-
tistical significance. Thus, there are substantial regional disparities in
the likelihood that a person indicted for first degree murder will actually
be convicted on that charge, and this pattern is compounded when we
consider the indictment and conviction stages together.
23 To estimate this effect we have omitted the white kills white category and included
black kills black in the regression equation. Black kills white shows a regression coefficient of




Attorney type appears to have less effect on conviction than it did
on indictment, and less effect on conviction than race, region, or legally
relevant factors. In otherwise comparable cases, court-appointed attor-
neys are less likely to avert a first degree murder conviction than either
public defenders or privately retained counsel, a finding consistent with
the pattern at indictment, though the effect shown in Table 3 is not
statistically significant. That attorney type appears to have less effect on
conviction is contrary to our expectation. One reason the difference at
conviction is not greater may be that privately retained counsel and
public defenders are more effective than court-appointed attorneys in
negotiating an agreement that the prosecutor not ask for a death pen-
alty in exchange for the defendant pleading guilty to first degree mur-
der. The data to be presented in Table 4 bear further upon this
possibility.
That type of attorney will affect the outcome of capital cases is a
fact accepted by most of those members of the bar interviewed in the
Florida Justice Institute study.24 The study concentrated chiefly on the
provision of defense services, rather than the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in capital cases. The interviews with judges, prosecutors, and
defense attorneys dealt with the selection and appointment of defense
counsel in such cases, the remuneration available to them, their motives
and justifications for taking such cases, the training and experience they
bring to these cases, and the conditions of independence or interference
under which they work. Their responses help to explain the relatively
poor performance of court-appointed attorneys revealed in the statistical
analysis.
In response to questions about the impact of limited resources, espe-
cially the $3,500 maximum fee cap for defense services in capital cases,
25
respondents made the following observations:
The court won't give you anywhere near the kind of money you need to try
a capital case-the defendant is supposed to be on the same footing [as one
who can afford an attorney] and in no way is he-you can't prepare any
case for $2-3,000 and that's about what you're going to get.
26
You're doing a disservice to your other clients if you take the appointment
and get $3,500 and your paying clients suffer. . . . [t]he cap deters compe-
tent attorneys and leaves the judges a smaller pool of good attorneys to
24 M. Brennan, Capital Representation in the State of Florida 16-18 (Draft Report pre-
pared for the Florida Justice Institute, 1982).
25 M. Brennan, supra note 5, at 75. At the time the survey was conducted, FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 925.036 (West Supp. 1983) provided that no matter how many charges or counts were
involved, the maximum fee paid an attorney appointed according to FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 925.035 (West 1973 & West Supp. 1983) to defend a capital case was $3,500.
26 M. Brennan, Capital Representation in the State of Florida 83 (Second Working Paper
prepared for the Florida Justice Institute, 1982).
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appoint from . . . [and] doesn't provide much incentive to do the job
competently.
2 7
Dollar-wise [appointed attorneys] peak out before going to trial, meaning
the trial is his gift to the defendant-it's free-that's his practice he's cut-
ting into. His bills continue to pile up, his clierts call and ask, "Where is
he?" The cap makes hungry, inexperienced guy take cases, but attorneys
who can command fees can't afford to.
28
Several attorneys described the approach of court-appointed attor-
neys to such cases:
[W]here a judge appoints an attorney [that attorney's] natural reaction is
not to give the judge too hard a time.
If the defendant has to have an attorney appointed for him, he is lower
class and nobody cares if you lose the case.
[A]n appointed attorney is more likely to plead a defendant guilty-even
to first degree murder. They're happy, they got their fee and if they don't
negotiate the judge gets pissed.
It's insane to ruin your practice with a case like that unless to curry favor
with the judge [by taking the case despite the dollar cap].2 9
Some members of the bar explained that the way appointments are
made tends to load the dice against some categories of defendants. Ac-
cording to one judge, "[I don't] go down the list and automatically ap-
point the next name but [try] to use discretion and appoint a qualified
attorney, but not the 'best."' 30 Another said that a judge in the city
where he practices is believed to be "matching up incompetent attor-
neys with heinous defendants.
'3 1
Respondents also reported a lack of independence, if not interfer-
ence, from the bench. One attorney commented,
There's a problem where the judge holds the purse strings; judges make it
clear to the appointed attorney [that his] fee will be diminished and/or he
won't be appointed again, according to what he does outside of what they
expect of him (ie., to plead guilty, not make motions, etc.).
32
Those who take such appointments are generously characterized by
their colleagues as "new inexperienced attorneys" or more disparagingly
as attorneys who "appear to be competent in the sense that they are not
disbarred."
33
The Florida Justice Institute's analysis of these interviews presents a
detailed picture of a system that assigns the most death-prone defend-
27 M. Brennan, supra note 5, at 86.
28 Id. at 75.
29 Id. at 73, 76.
30 Id. at 65 (corrected by Mary Brennan from verbatim transcript of interview).
31 M. Brennan, supra note 24, at 42, 71.
32 M. Brennan, supra note 5, at 76.
33 M. Brennan, supra note 26, at 66, 75.
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ants to the least experienced attorneys, who lack the resources, incen-
tives, and even the independence to provide the kind of defense their
clients especially require. Moreover, even if the perceptions of these re-
spondents are not accurate in all instances, they nevertheless constitute a
"social reality" that is bound to have a demoralizing effect upon the
way court-appointed attorneys approach their work. 34 Thus, the statis-
tical data on court processing of homicide cases in Florida and the inter-
view data from the Florida Justice Institute's study tell the same story in
different but complementary ways.
IV. THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION IN THE SENTENCING STAGE OF
THE PROCESS
Sentencing decisions were the chief locus of the arbitrariness in cap-
ital punishment according to the Supreme Court's diagnosis. As a solu-
tion, the Supreme Court, in Gregg v. Georgia 3 5 approved sentencing
reforms that were supposed to insulate and guide the exercise of sentenc-
ing discretion and also were believed to eliminate arbitrariness that
might otherwise enter at earlier stages in the process. As we have seen,
however, the Court was wrong about the presumed derivative benefits
of these sentencing reforms; arbitrariness by race and location are
strongly evident at indictment and conviction. What about the primary
target of post-Funnan statutory reforms? Has this solution at least suc-
ceeded in purging arbitrariness from the sentencing process?
To carry our analysis of the sentencing decision a step further with
the Florida processing data, we have performed a multiple regression
analysis using the same legal and extralegal factors examined in Tables
2 and 3. The analysis is based on 191 cases with complete information,
or sixty-three percent of the 305 first degree murder convictions in the
1973-1977 combined sample. The results of this analysis appear in Ta-
ble 4.
34 For a summary discussion of the differences between various types of attorneys and
what that social reality is like, see M. Brennan, supra note 5, at 90-92.




ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF LEGAL AND EXTRALEGAL FACTORS ON
DEATH SENTENCES AMONG PERSONS CONVICTED OF FIRST DEGREE
MURDER IN FLORIDA, 1973-1977
A. Legally Relevant Factors
Felony related killing
More than one offender
More than one victim
Female victim
Victim 60 years or oldera
Victim 16 years or youngera
Gun used as murder weapon
Defendant accessory

































Number of Cases 191
a Victims aged 17-59 is the reference category.
b Black kills black is the reference category.
c Southern region of Florida is the reference category as defined in Table 1, note c.
d Privately retained attorneys is the reference category.
* p < .05, t test.
p < .01, 1 test.
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Among the legally aggravating factors, felony circumstance, and, to
a lesser, nonsignificant extent, both multiple offenders and multiple vic-
tims appear to contribute to the imposition of a death sentence. In
contrast to the indictment and the conviction stages, however, a female
victim has no effect, but a youthful victim has a sizeable, though non-
significant, 36 effect on sentencing. All three mitigating factors appar-
ently impede the imposition of a death sentence. Because this sample of
first degree murder convictions is much smaller than the samples in Ta-
bles 1 and 3, estimated effects of a given size are less likely to achieve
statistical significance. Thus, of six legally relevant variables with coef-
ficients of. 10 or greater, only felony circumstance has an effect that is
statistically significant.
Among the variables reflecting offender-victim racial combinations,
there is evidence of a white-victim effect at the sentencing stage. Both
black kills white and white kills white cases are more likely to receive a
death sentence than the black kills black reference category, and far
more likely than the relatively few white kills black cases. When the
white-victim cases are combined and examined with black-victim cases
as the reference category, the effect of having a white victim (b = .13)
approaches statistical significance (p = . 11).3 7 Thus, racial considera-
tions appear to affect each successive stage of the process and have a
consistent cumulative effect over the entire process, apart from a
number of legally aggravating and mitigating factors.
Regional disparities in sentencing are even greater than they were
at other stages of the process. Courts in the northern region are far
more likely to impose a death sentence on convicted first degree murder-
ers than those elsewhere in the state. The difference between the north-
ern and the southern regions (as the reference category) is highly
significant and virtually as great as any other effect in Table 4. The
likelihood of a death sentence is also greater in the central than in the
southern region, though not significantly so, given the size of the sample.
Since the central region is also more likely to indict and convict on capi-
tal charges, the cumulative effect of the process in the central region
may nevertheless rival the death sentence proneness of the northern re-
gion at the sentencing stage. At each stage of the process, the southern
region is clearly less likely than the rest of the state to move otherwise
36 Because of the relatively small number of youthful offenders convicted of first degree
murder in this sample, the regression coefficient that would be significant in a larger sample
does not reach statistical significance here.
37 It should be noted at this point that the use of the felony circumstance variable drawn
from the court case records may spuriously reduce our estimates of racial effects because of
the apparent "upgrading" of white-victim cases to include allegations of a felony circum-
stance in the court case records where none appeared in the police reports. See W. Bowers,
supra note 3, at 245, Table 7-9. The true effect of victim's race may, therefore, be even
stronger than shown in Tables 1, 3, and 4.
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comparable cases toward a death sentence. These regional disparities
are statistically significant at each stage of the process and their cumula-
tive effect over the entire process is far beyond chance statistical
variation.
Finally, type of attorney is among the strongest factors affecting the
sentences received by convicted first degree murderers. Being defended
by a court-appointed attorney is on a par with having committed a fel-
ony-related murder as a predictor that a convicted defendant will be
sentenced to death. Having a public defender as counsel is also signifi-
cantly associated with receiving a death sentence. The disadvantage of
being defended by court-appointed attorneys in the sentencing process
may reflect, in part, their ineffectiveness at the earlier stage in trading a
first degree murder guilty plea for the prosecutor's promise not to seek
the death penalty. This would mean that more of the court-appointed
attorney's cases that resulted in a first degree murder conviction were
subjected to a penalty trial. In any case, over the entire process from
indictment through sentencing, having a court appointed attorney is al-
most as great a disadvantage in the defendant's effort to avoid the death
penalty as having killed a white rather than a black person.
Our findings in Florida were replicated recently by a study con-
ducted in Georgia. There, still stronger evidence of racial and regional
disparities in sentencing were compiled in the preliminary report of
David Baldus, George Woodworth, and Charles Pulaski.38 Baldus,
Woodworth, and Pulaski collected. extensive data on more than 600
cases in which the defendants were found guilty by a jury or pleaded
guilty to first degree murder charges between 1973 and 1978. They ob-
tained data on over 250 potentially aggravating or mitigating factors for
each case from official records of the Georgia Supreme Court, the Geor-
gia Department of Offender Rehabilitation, the Georgia Department of
Probations and Paroles, and Georgia's Bureau of Vital Statistics; data
were also obtained from questionnaires sent to defense counsel and pros-
ecutors. With these data, Baldus and his associates examined race-of-
victim disparities in sentencing for cases that were: (1) eligible for a
death sentence on each of Georgia's ten statutory aggravating circum-
stances; (2) matched in terms of the number of statutory aggravating
circumstances present; (3) equated on an index constructed to reflect
both aggravating and mitigating factors most predictive of sentencing
outcomes; (4) similar in terms of specific aggravating and mitigating fac-
38 D. Baldus, G. Woodworth & C. Pulaski, The Impact of Procedural Reform on Exces-
siveness, Differential Treatment Along Racial Lines and Arbitrariness in Death Sentencing:
The Georgia Experience Before and After Furman v. Georgia (1982) (Draft Report to the





LIKELIHOOD OF A PENALTY TRIAL BY RACE OF VICTIM AT VARIOUS
LEVELS OF AGGRAVATION/MITIGATION AMONG CONVICTED FIRST
DEGREE MURDERERS IN GEORGIA: 1973-1978a
Level of
aggravation/mitigation White Victim Cases Black Victim Cases














8 (high) 1.0 1.0
(32) (3)
a Drawn from Baldus, Woodworth & Pulaski, supra note 38, at n.98, Part II.
tors identified as most important in regression analyses; and (5) alike in
"salient features" as determined on an ad hoc basis from a close reading
of the cases.3 9 In each of these analyses, they found substantial and con-
sistent sentencing differences by race of victim in otherwise comparable
cases. They found, moreover, that these disparities were due more to
prosecutorial decisions to seek the death sentence than to jury decisions
to impose the death sentence.
The role of prosecutorial discretion in the sentencing process is
presented in Table 5. As to white victim and black victim murders for
which there were jury convictions, the Table shows the likelihood of a
sentencing trial at corresponding levels on an index constructed to re-
flect the most predictive aggravating and mitigating factors on the hold-
ing of a penalty trial. This is the third and the most conservative of their
analytic approaches presented.40 The regression-based index of aggra-
vating and mitigating factors was constructed specifically to provide a
conservative test of hypothesized racial disparities by excluding race of
39 Id. at 17-27.




LIKELIHOOD OF A DEATH SENTENCE BY REGION AT VARIOUS
LEVELS OF AGGRAVATION/MITIGATION AMONG CONVICTED FIRST
DEGREE MURDERERS IN GEORGIA: 1973-1978a
Levels of North Fulton
aggravation/mitigation North Central County Southeast Southwest
1 (low) .0 .0 - - -
(1) (5)
2 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
(11) (12) (7) (14) (14)
3 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
(14) (34) (24) (45) (25)
4 .0 .0 .0 .07 .0
(9) (21) (20) (14) (26)
5 .0 .14 .06 .0 .17
(9) (28) (17) (11) (12)
6 .0 .05 .10 .14 .11
(2) (21) (10) (7) (9)
7 .0 .61 .17 .07 .10
(6) (18) (6) (14) (10)
8 (high) .40 .75 .38 .77 .68
(10) (51) (16) (26) (28)
a Drawn from Baldus, Woodworth & Pulaski, supra note 38, at Table 25.
victim as a regressor. Thus, some of the effects of victim's race are incor-
porated into the index by the presence of correlated factors such as vic-
tim's social class.
According to Table 5, Georgia prosecutors decide to hold penalty
trials disproportionately in white victim cases as opposed to black victim
cases at most levels of aggravation/mitigation. There are consistent and
sometimes striking disparities of treatment by race of victim, notwith-
standing the conservative bias of this regression-based aggrava-
tion/mitigation index. As a consequence, sentencing juries see mostly
white victim cases at relatively high levels of aggravation. Race-of-vic-
tim comparisons of jury decisions to impose death sentences are thus
limited by the small number of black victim cases at a given aggrava-
tion/mitigation level. The differences that do appear, however, tend to
compound further the disparities at intermediate levels of
aggravation/mitigation.
Baldus and his associates also examined specific sentencing dispari-
ties for convicted first degree murderers in five regional groupings of
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judicial circuits in Georgia.4' Their analysis reveals extreme sentencing
disparities by region, especially as aggravation level increases, as shown
in Table 6. Thus, among the most aggravated cases, no more than forty
percent of the convicted murderers receive a death sentence in the
northern region and Fulton County, compared to at least two-thirds of
their counterparts in the other three regions. The investigators show,
moreover, that these extreme disparities persist when the comparisons
are restricted to white victim cases.42 These regional disparities are un-
derscored by the fact that just twenty-six, or fifteen percent, of Georgia's
159 counties were responsible for eighty-five percent of the death
sentences imposed between 1973 and 1978 in that state.
4 3
In continuing research, Baldus and his associates have gathered ad-
ditional data on the process of Georgia homicide cases from indictment
through sentencing, extending the period of coverage through 1979. Al-
though the analyses of these data are still preliminary, Baldus summa-
rized the cumulative findings of this research in an affidavit of June 22,
1982, prepared for the petitioner in Smith v. Balkcom:44
Differential treatment of white and black victim cases appears to prevail
at each stage of the capital charging and sentencing process beyond initial
indictment-specifically in plea bargaining decisions, jury guilt decisions,
the prosecutor's decision to proceed to a penalty trial, and the jury's deci-
sion at sentencing.
45
With the evidence of race- and region-linked sentencing differen-
tials in Florida46 and with stronger, more rigorously controlled evidence
of this sort now becoming available on Georgia,4 7 it is obvious that de-
spite statutory sentencing guidelines and separate sentencing hearings,
the sentencing stage of the process is still subject to the extralegal influ-
ence of race and place. Thus, of the three reforms approved in Gregg-
statutory sentencing guidelines, separate sentencing hearings, and auto-
matic appellate review-the last of these must-bear a heavy burden if
the post-Furman capital statutes are to meet the Furman standard.
41 Id at 104-11.
42 Id. at 110 Table 26.
43 Id. at 106 n.107,
44 Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 181 (1982).
45 D. Baldus, G. Woodworth & C.'Pulaski, The Differential Treatment of White and
Black Victim Homicide Cases in Georgia's Capital Charging and Sentencing Process: Prelim-
inary Findings 29, app. D to Petitioner's, cert. petition in Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573
(5th Cir. 1981),petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. - (U.S. June 22, 1982) (No. 81-6978), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 181 (1982).
46 See supra Table 4; see also W. Bowers, supra note 3, at Chapter Seven.
47 See Table 5 and Table 6.
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V. STATE APPELLATE REVIEW
The United States Supreme Court declared in Gregg that automatic
appellate review of all death sentences "serves as a check against the
random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. '4 In this context,
Justice White commented that Georgia's statutory provision for "pro-
portionality review" requires the Georgia Supreme Court to "do much
more than determine whether the penalty was lawfully imposed. '49 He
noted that "[i]t must go on to decide-after reviewing the penalties im-
posed in 'similar cases'-whether the penalty is 'excessive or dispropor-
tionate' considering both the crime and the defendant." 50
State appellate courts however, may, be ill-prepared and perhaps
disinclined to perform the oversight and monitoring functions assigned
to them under the new capital statutes. They generally do not compare
the sentence in one case with those in others, nor do they directly collect
and evaluate evidence; instead, arguments are reviewed on the basis of
evidence that has been admitted in other courts. Evidence that the ap-
pellate review process is not living up to the Supreme Court's expecta-
tions is mounting. We have demonstrated elsewhere 5' that racial and
locational disparities in the imposition of death sentences are not being
reduced by the actions of the state supreme courts of Florida and
Georgia.
Baldus, Pulaski, and Woodworth recently completed a more de-
tailed study of Georgia's appellate review process.5 2 For its proportion-
ality review, the Georgia Supreme Court is required by statute to
identify cases "similar" in characteristics of the crime and the defendant
to the one under review, and then to compare the sentence under review
with those imposed in these similar cases. The pool from which the
court may select "similar" cases should, according to the Georgia stat-
ute, include capital cases in which sentences were imposed after January
1, 1970. The statute also requires that the cases selected as similar be
cited in an appendix to each of the court's published opinions upholding
a death sentence.
53
Baldus and his associates examined the court's selection of similar
cases for its proportionaltiy reviews of sixty-eight affirmed post-Funman
death sentences for murder. Using the detailed data collected on some
48 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976).
49 Id. at 223.
50 Id.
51 See W. Bowers, supra note 3, at 36, Tables 7-14 and 7-15 and accompanying text.
52 D. Baldus, G. Woodworth & C. Pulaski, Proportionality Review of Death Sentences:
An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience (1982) (Draft report to the National Institute
of Justice, Center for Interdisciplinary Studies, College of Law, Syracuse University).
53 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-10-35, -37 (1981).
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750 capital cases (approximately 150 pre-Furman and 600 post-Funnan)
during the period 1970-1978, Baldus, Woodworth, and Pulaski com-
pared the cases cited as similar by the court with cases identified as (1)
comparable in terms of aggravation/mitigation index scores; (2)
matched on the basis of specific facts or main determinants analysis; and
(3) alike in the salient features of the case.54 They found that the cases
cited as similar by the Georgia Supreme Court were more highly aggra-
vated and more likely to have received a death sentence than those iden-
tified as similar by any of the three empirically based and objectively
specified methods the researchers employed.
The author is currently conducting an analysis of the Georgia re-
view process using a somewhat different approach.5 5 Instead of identify-
ing similar cases by objective standards and then comparing them with
those cited by the court as similar, our approach has been to identify the
factors that distinguish the cases chosen as similar from those eligible
cases the court did not select. That is, we have attempted to discover
the criteria the Georgia Supreme Court actually applies, knowingly or
otherwise, in the selection of similar cases.
56
We are using the Georgia Supreme Court's own data, collected spe-
cifically for purposes of proportionality review as directed by Georgia's
capital statute, on all capital cases resulting in life or death sentences
that were appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court after January, 1970.
The data come from a six-page questionnaire completed by trial judges
in cases where a death sentence was imposed under the post-Furmkn stat-
ute, and by a clerk of the court for all cases where the sentence was life
as well as for the pre-Funnan cases where the sentence was death. The
questionnaires provide data on the crime, the defendant, the trial pro-
cess, and the outcome or disposition of the case including jury findings
and sentence imposed. The data for some 297 murder cases tried be-
tween 1970 and 1977 (including the first thirty-six post-Furman death
sentences for murder reviewed for proportionality) were obtained pursu-
ant to a motion for discovery filed by Atlanta attorney Millard
54 These correspond to procedures (3) through (5) as enumerated in the text accompany-
ing note 39, supra, and they are described in detail in D. Baldus, G. Woodworth & C. Pulaski,
supra note 38.
55 W. Bowers, J. McDevitt & A. Diana, Proportionality Review by the Georgia Supreme
Court: Evaluation or Rationalization? (1983) (unpublished manuscript, Center for Applied
Social Research, Northeastern University).
56 This approach avoids the difficulty of making a priori assumptions about the standards
of comparability the Georgia Supreme Court should have used in specific cases. A federal
district court judge raised this objection in evidentiary hearings for House v. Balkcom, 562 F.
Supp. 1111 (N.D. Ga. 1983), and McCorquodale v. Balkcom, 525 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Ga.
1981), to our earlier analysis of these data in which we generated groups of similar cases in
terms of the number of persons killed, the presence of accompanying felony circumstances, a
prior record of criminal violence, and the use of a firearm as the murder weapon.
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Farmer.57 The Georgia Supreme Court has since refused to release the
data on subsequently reviewed cases. 58
These data show that the Georgia Supreme Court chose cases that
are not more consistently similar to the ones under review than the other
cases in the pool. By statute, the characteristics of the crime and the
defendant should determine which cases are similar and the court
should compare the sentence imposed in the case under review with the
cases found to be similar. Instead, the court seems to have reversed the
procedure. What most distinguishes the cases chosen by the court from
those eligible59 but not chosen is the fact that the original sentence was
death and has been upheld by the Georgia Supreme Court. In effect,
the court defines as similar those cases in which the death sentence has
been handed down and upheld, whether the characteristics of the crime
or the defendant are similar to the ones under review.
Our complex statistical analysis led us to the simple but revealing
picture of the proportionality review process given in Table 7. It shows
for each of the first thirty-six affirmed death sentences for murder how
many of the cases cited as "similar" were life cases after 1970, how many
were death cases under the pre-Furman statute, and how many were
death cases under the present post-Furman statute effective April 1973.
In all, the Georgia Supreme court cited only eighteen life cases (the
total of the second column figures), or less than ten percent, of the more
than 200 life sentences appealed to the Court between 1970 and 1977.
Moreover, seventeen of these were pre-April 1973 life cases cited in the
first six reviews, and not cited again after the thirteenth case (A. Smith).
The court cited only one life case under the new statute (as similar to
Dix). In only one case (Moore) were more life than death sentences
cited as similar.
60
The court cited twenty-two pre-Furman death cases, almost two-
thirds of them in the very first review. Over half of these were cited in
ten of the first fourteen reviews, and no additional pre-Furman death
cases were cited after the ninth review (Jarrell). Then, as post-Furnan
57 Willis v. State, 243 Ga. 185, 253 S.E.2d 70, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979).
58 D. Baldus, Personal communication with Curtis French, Clerk of the Georgia Supreme
Court (Sept. 28, 1983).
59 For a given proportionality review, the eligible pool is defined as all life and death cases
after 1970 that have been appealed to and reviewed by the Georgia Supreme Court on or
before the review date of the case in question.
60 Moore's case is truly extraordinary in that the trial judge imposed death-without jury
recommendations- after the defendant pleaded guilty and despite the mitigating facts that
the defendant had cooperated with the police, had no prior criminal record, was youthful,
had been intoxicated, and was first shot at by the victim. Moore v. State, 233 Ga. 861, 213
S.E.2d 829 (1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976). Federal District
Judge Edenfield later vacated the Georgia Supreme Court's proportionality review sub nom.
Blake v. Zant, 513 F. Supp. 772, 818 (S.D. Ga. 1981), at'd, 709 F.2d 1353 (1983).
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TABLE 7
CASES CITED AS SIMILAR BY THE GEORGIA SUPREME COURT IN THE
FIRST 36 PROPORTIONALITY REVIEWS OF THE DEATH SENTENCE
FOR MURDER
Life Sentences Death Sentences
between 1970 prior to June Death Sentences
and 1977 1972 since April 1973
Number of Number of
Cases Cited First Previously First Previously First Previously Citations in
Defendants as Similar Cited Cited Cited Cited Cited Cited Later Reviews
House 18 4 - 14 30
Gregg 18 - 3a I 13a  1 27
Ross 6 - la 1 4a- 3
Floyd 18 - 3b - 13 1 1 27
McCorquodale 20 4 3 - II 2a 6
Moore 23 9 4 4 5 - Ia 13
Mitchell 16 - ia 1 10 2 2 9
Chenault 15 - - - 12 - 3a  12
Jarrell 19 - 1 1 12 I 4b 11
Berryhill 7 - - - 7 - - 10
Tamplin 16 - - - 11 1 4 2
R. Smith 19 - 3 - 13 - 3a  12
A. Smith 19 - 3a - 13a  - 3a  12
Mason 16 - - - 12
a  I 3a 11
Dobbs 15 - - - 7 3 5 5
Goodwin 12 - - - 5a - 7a 4
Pulliam 15 - - - 7b 8b 8
Spencer 5 - - - 4 l
a  I
Davis 15 - - - 5 3 7 4
Birt 14 - - - 8 2 4a  6
Gibson 15 - - - 5 - 10 2
Coleman 19 - - - 12 1 6 6
Isaacs 19 - - - 12a  - 7a 6
Street 15 - - - 5 - 10 0
Dungee 19 - - - 12 - 7 6
Banks 19 - - - 12
a  
- 7a 7
Stephens 19 - - - 12a  - 7a  4
Harris 16 - - - j0b 6c 3
Hill 26 - - 4 2 20
b.c  I






Pryor 22 2 20 1
Douthit 19 6 1 12 0






Blake 5 1 4 -
TOTALS 18 22 37
a Includes only cases of this type cited in the preceding review.
b Includes all cases of this type cited in the preceding review.
e Includes three post-Furman death cases reversed by the Georgia Supreme Court in proce-
dural grounds.
d Imposed under the post-Furman capital statute.
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death sentences were reviewed and affirmed, virtually all were cited by
the court in subsequent reviews. Indeed, the court had cited all but one
(Street) of the first thirty-two affirmed death cases by the thirty-sixth
review (rightmost column of Table 7). Moreover, of the first four post-
Furman death sentences upheld by the court, three were cited in at least
twenty-seven of the subsequent thirty-two reviews; another seven were
cited in ten or more subsequent reviews. As the notes to Table 7 indi-
cate, there also was a tendency for the court simply to draw "similar"
cases from the group cited in the immediately preceding review.
Thus, from the substantial pool of almost 300 cases available for
proportionality review by 1977, the Georgia Supreme Court repeatedly
relied upon a small and highly selective subsample. It cited predomi-
nantly death cases, then exclusively death cases, and increasingly the
death cases it had affirmed in previous proportionality reviews; fewer
than one in ten of the available life cases and virtually nine out of ten
previously affirmed post-Furman death cases were cited in these propor-
tionality reviews.
61
This is not proportionality review as mandated by the Georgia cap-
ital statute and approved by the United States Supreme Court in Gregg,
but a process of legally rationalizing trial court decisions to impose
death as punishment, regardless of proportionality or excessiveness rela-
tive to the sentences in similar cases. Thus, arbitrariness is evident in the
decisions and actions of state appellate court judges, as well as those of
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and juries; automatic appellate review,
like sentencing guidelines and separate penalty hearings, also has failed
to serve its intended purpose.
VI. FEDERAL APPELLATE REVIEW
The burden of detecting and correcting arbitrariness and discrimi-
61 Ofcourse, these same data could be used by the Georgia Supreme Court to see whether
there are systematic statewide disparities of treatment among cases similar in legally relevant
ways. For example, the data show substantial differences in likelihood of a death sentence by
race of offender and victim and by geographical location within the state among cases compa-
rable both in felony circumstance and prior criminal record, the principal legally aggravating
factors alleged to account for racial differences. See Kleck, Racial Discrimination in Criminal
Sentencing: A Critical Evaluation of the Evidence with Additional Evidence on the Death Penaly 416 AM.
Soc. REV. 783 (1981). Further, these data reveal that 72% of the convicted offenders who
were transients in the community where the crime occurred-as compared with 25% of those
who were residents--received a death sentence. Although the number of transient offenders
is relatively small for statistical comparisons, this difference is not attributable to differences
in the felony circumstances of the crime or the prior record of the defendants. With these
continually accumulating data on hand and these leads to pursue, the Georgia Supreme
Court might be expected to investigate disparities of treatment associated with place, race,
residency, and so forth, and make available the accumulating data for what they may reveal
about the constitutionality of the death penalty as applied and reviewed for proportionality.
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nation in capital sentencing and at earlier stages of the process has fallen
by necessity upon the federal appellate courts. Challenges to the death
penalty as applied came first to the federal district courts in southern
states where death sentences were most commonly imposed. These
courts, in turn, looked to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
(whose decisions then governed the actions of trial and appellate courts
in Florida, Georgia, and Texas, as well as most other southern states) for
standards to apply in judging death penalty appeals. Such standards
were established in the case of John Spinkelink.
In its September, 1977 representation of John Spinkelink, the Legal
Defense Fund presented evidence of racial bias-specifically, the dispro-
portionate use of the death sentence in white victim cases-in the ad-
ministration of Florida's capital statute.62 At that time there were 114
men on death row, of whom ninety-four percent had killed only whites,
two percent had killed both whites and blacks, and four percent had
killed only blacks-in a state where most homicide victims are black.
63
Eighty-five of 114 had committed their murders in the course of another
felony, typically robbery.64 Of these, eighty-three were white victim
cases; one was a mixed race and one a black victim case. Compared to
their incidence in the population, white victim felony-related killings
were thirty-one times more likely to be punished by death than black
victim felony killings. 65 These statistics were presented by expert wit-
nesses for Spinkelink at an evidentiary hearing in the Tallahassee fed-
eral district court with the following statement: "The statistics provide
prima facie evidence of bias, strong enough to suggest that the burden of
proving that no such bias exists should shift to the prosecutor. He
should be required to show that the statistical discrepancy is the result of
some factor other than bias."
'66
The district court denied Spinkelink's petition,67 and this ruling
was appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. A three-
judge panel of the Fifth Circuit then ruled that these statistical data
were irrelevant and that the defendant must show "racially discrimina-
tory intent or purpose" in terms of specific actions taken against him in
his case, in order to demonstrate a violation of constitutional protec-
tion.68 The court held that the Florida statute itself was immune from
constitutional challenges of arbitrariness and that such a statistical anal-
62 Unpublished data collected by W. Sheppard & H. Carithers, Jacksonville, Florida
(1972-1981) (On file in the Harvard Law School Library).
63 Zeisel, supra note 9, at 458.
64 Id. at 459.
65 Id. at 460.
66 Id at 461, (reprinting the report of the expert witness).
67 Spinkelink v. Wainwright, No. 77-0895, slip op. (N.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 1977).
68 Spinkelink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 615, 616 (5th Cir. 1978).
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ysis was, therefore, unwarranted and beyond the court's review obliga-
tions. Relying upon language in Proftitt v. Florida,69  the court
determined that the Florida statute was not subject to challenge as ap-
plied except in those cases where petitioners could show specific acts of
intentional discrimination against them because of their or their victims'
race.
70
In effect, by closing the door on statistical evidence and restricting
the scope of federal appellate review, the Spinklink decision erected a
judicial shield against challenges of arbitrariness and discrimination in
the states of the Fifth Circuit, where the death penalty is now and has
been most widely used. In other words, Spftzkelink provided the protec-
tion behind which the new statutes approved in Gregg might operate
relatively free of monitoring by the federal courts for the kinds of consti-
tutional violations that invalidated the former statutes.
7'
In June 1979, shortly after Spinkelink's execution, the NAACP Le-
gal Defense Fund challenged Georgia's capital statute in the Atlanta
federal district court at combined evidentiary hearings in the cases of
House v. Balkcom 72 and McCorquodale v. Balkcom 73 by presenting statistical
evidence on the application of Georgia's capital statute. In House and
69 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
70 The Fifth Circuit's response to the statistical evidence of racial bias in Spinkelink v.
Wainwright closely resembles the Eighth Circuit's reaction to similar evidence ten years ear-
lier in Maxwell v. Bishop, 39 F.2d 138 (1968), vacated, 398 U.S. 262 (1970). Both courts held
that the statistical evidence of vast racial disparities in the likelihood of a death sentence was,
nevertheless, inadequate because some legally relevant but omitted factors conceivably could
have accounted for the racial disparities. The courts further found the statistical evidence
irrelevant because the data were not specific to the handling of the case under review. Al-
though in Maxwell the data on rape cases came from 19 representative counties in Arkansas,
the county in which Maxwell was tried was not included.
Ironically, eight years after the Maxwell court ruled that this evidence was inadequate
and irrelevant, the Solicitor General of the United States conceded, in his amicus brief sup-
porting capital punishment in Gregg and companion cases, that the statistical evidence
presented in Maxwell clearly justified conclusions of racial discrimination: "[W]e do not ques-
tion [the Arkansas study's] conclusion that during the twenty years in question, in southern
states, there was discrimination in rape cases." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae,
app. A at 5a, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), reprinted in Zeisel, supra note 9, at 458.
71 The Fifth Circuit's commitment to this Spinkelink shield was underscored a year later.
In August 1979, a panel of the Fifth Circuit held in Jurek v. Estelle, 593 F.2d 672 (5th Cir.
1979) (jurek I), that statistical patterns of racial disparities could suffice asprimafacie evidence
of "intent to discriminate," citing the legal principle that actors are responsible for the natu-
ral and foreseeable consequences of their actions. Within weeks, Jurek was withdrawn for
rehearing en banc. Within three months, a replacement version ofJurek v. Estelle, 593 F.2d
672 (5th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 623 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1001 (1981), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1014 (1981) (jurekIl), appeared with no reference
to the role of statistical evidence in demonstrating intent to discriminate, thus leaving intact
the judicial shield established by Spinkelink.
72 C78-471A, slip op. (1979), petition for habeas relieffiom death sentence granted, 562 F.Supp.
1111 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
73 525 F.Supp. 431 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
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McCorquodale, data revealed both disparities by race like those presented
in Spinkelink and disparities by region within the state. As in Florida,
the data documented disproportionate imposition of the death sentence
especially for white victim killings, and the bias was present for both
felony and nonfelony homicides. The data further revealed disparities
of treatment for judicial circuits grouped regionally, for felony- or
nonfelony-type killings, and for white victim or black victim felony-type
murders.
74
To challenge this evidence, the state engaged Timothy S. Carr, Di-
rector of Research for the Georgia Department of Corrections, as an
expert, but did not call him to the witness stand. In a letter to the pre-
siding federal magistrate, Mr. Carr offered his professional evaluation,
saying that the magnitude of the racial disparities "is as great as any-
thing I have ever seen in my seven years of processing and interpreting
criminal justice data in Georgia," and that he "did not believe that a
difference of this magnitude would 'wash out' statistically even if all the
[legally relevant] factors . . . were to work in concert to nullify it.
' '75
The federal magistrate's order in Hose and McCorquodale disal-
lowed further consideration of this statistical evidence of racial and re-
gional disparities, explicitly indicating that such evidence did not meet
the standard established in Spinkelink.76  This evidence eventually
reached the Fifth Circuit in the case of Smith v. Balkcom (Smith I),77 at
which point the circuit court rejected it, citing Spinkelink.
Then came the first scoring of the Spinkelink shield. The Fifth Cir-
cuit withdrew its Smith opinion for rehearing and issued a modified
opinion in Smith v. Balkcom (Smith I1),78 which explicitly recognized that
statistical evidence could serve as proof of "intent to discriminate"
under a fourteenth amendment equal protection challenge. The court,
however, rejected the particular statistical evidence presented in Smith I,
saying that it "falls short. . . of establishing an equal protection viola-
tion." 79 This turnaround came just as the Fifth Circuit was split into
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. Because the case was argued before the
bifurcation, however, Smith II was binding on the courts of both circuits.
The new Eleventh Circuit court recently took a further step in Prof
ftt v. Wainwright.80 Citing the United States Supreme Court's decision
74 See W. Bowers, supra note 3, at Chapter Seven.
75 Smith v. Balkcom,petition for cert. 24-25 (U.S. June 22, 1982)(No. 81-6978).
76 See McCorquodale v. Balkcom, 525 F. Supp. 431, 432 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
77 660 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981).
78 677 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1982).
79 This represented a return to the position purged from Jurek I byJurek I-a slight but
definite weakening of the Spinkelink shield. See supra note 71.
80 685 F.2d 1227 (11th Cir. 1982).
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in Godfrey v. Georgia8' as precedent, the Eleventh Circuit held that both
sentencing and review decisions of state trial and appellate courts were
open to eighth amendment challenges in the application of statutory
and nonstatutory sentencing criteria. The Proffitt court held that "in
view of Godfrey, we can only conclude that the language in the Spinke/ink
opinion precluding federal courts from reviewing state court's applica-
tion of capital sentencing criteria is no longer sound precedent.1
82
In effect, the protection afforded post-Furman capital statutes by
Spinkehnk-which itself arbitrarily impeded constitutional challenges to
the application of these statutes-was weakened by Smith II in the geo-
graphically restricted jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit, and by Smith II
and Proffitt in the jurisdiction of the newly formed Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit. The actions taken in Smith If and Proffitt mean
that federal courts in these two circuits now have a freer hand in moni-
toring the application of existing capital statutes, and that statistically-
based challenges to the death penalty as applied will soon be brought to
the United States Supreme Court on appeal. That is to say, the
Supreme Court will soon be faced again with the question it sidestepped
in declining to hear Spinkelink v. Wainwrzght, this time with considerably
stronger evidence of arbitrariness and discrimination.
VII. CONCLUSION
The evidence of arbitrariness and discrimination presented here is
qualitatively more than a statistical demonstration that sentencing prac-
tices of certain states have failed to meet the Furman standard. Beyond
this, we have seen that the arbitrariness is manifold in its links to race,
location within a state, and other personal, situational, and social influ-
ences; pervasive in its presence at various decision points in the handling
of capital cases; intractable under different kinds of statutes in different
states; and replicated in different kinds of studies using different kinds of
data. These findings represent an extension of our perspective on arbi-
trariness in capital punishment in that they explicate some of the ways
in which extralegal influences operate even in the presence of post-
Furman statutory reforms--how prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
judges, as well as jurors, become the agents of both systematic and un-
systematic arbitrariness.
The evidence further confirms the view that arbitrariness is inher-
ent in the use of capital punishment. 83 Where death is available as pun-
81 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
82 685 F.2d at 1262 n.52.




ishment, according to this theory, it will be used in ways that reflect
dominant community sentiments and that override standards of even-
handed justice, whatever form the capital statutes may take. To be
sure, statutory reforms possibly may affect how and where arbitrariness
occurs in the handling of cases, but changes are apt to be more apparent
than real. Thus, the vast difference in the use of the death penalty by
location within states observed since Furman appears to have been a pat-
tern consistent with the pre-Funnan era. Further, differential treatment
by race of victim, so apparent in the post-Furman era, also has domi-
nated as a source of bias historically. A great many other extralegal
factors such as wealth, property ownership, resident/transient status in
the community, and unpopular political or religious beliefs may also
affect the handling of cases, but have not been examined thus far for
lack of systematic data. The consistent cumulative effect of attorney
type adds a further element of arbitrariness and may reflect the influ-
ence of factors yet to be examined.
Above all, the evidence presented here should dispel the notion that
the problem of arbitrariness is confined to sentencing. Its presence is
clear in the sentencing process-disparities by race and location persist
under strong statistical controls for legally relevant considerations-but
such arbitrariness also appears at every other stage of the process that
we have been able to examine. Greater guidance in sentencing and
stricter separation between the guilt and punishment decisions have
failed not only as a solution to the problem of arbitrary sentencing of
convicted offenders, but also, contrary to Justice White's hopes, as a stat-
utory guide to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The data show
that neither prosecutorial decisions made before or after trial nor the
judgment of guilt itself is free from recurrent biases. Furthermore, over
successive stages of the process these biases-especially the racial bias-
are cumulative in nature.
So far, the federal courts, especially the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, have taken the narrow view that arbitrariness must be
demonstrated strictly and specifically in sentencing, and that statistical
evidence is irrelevant, as in Spinkelink, or insufficient, as in Smith II, be-
cause it does not strictly focus upon sentencing or control for conceiva-
bly confounding factors. Yet, the Furman Justices objected to the
freakish, rare, arbitrary use of the death penalty in which one defendant
and not another was condemned to death with no meaningful distinc-
tion between their cases, whether this was the product of sentencing or
decisions elsewhere in the process. That statutory sentencing guidelines
would seem, according to the Gregg Court, to remedy the problem, does
not mean that the Court found arbitrariness constitutionally acceptable
if it occurred elsewhere. Why else would Justice White address himself
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to the presumed derivative benefits of sentencing guidelines on the exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion? It is cynical to suppose that the Supreme
Court is concerned only with the arbitrariness and biases ofjurors, while
granting to the regular participants in the criminal justice process the
privilege of caprice and systematic bias at the expense of the capital
defendant whose cost may be his life. The language of Chief Justice
Burger in Furman was "evenhanded justice," not "evenhanded
sentencing."
